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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX BAUCUS
A RECOMMENDED CLINTON CHINA POLICY
BUSINESS COALITION FOR U.S. - CHINA TRADE

JANUARY 7, 1993
One of the first major foreign policy decisions facing the new Congress and the new
Administration will be the annual review of China's Most Favored Nation -- MFN -- trading

status. Although the Congressional debates on the subject have been impassioned, I believe
that we can -- we must -- continue China's MFN status because it is in the best interests of
the United States to do so.
In June of 1989, the United States and the world condemned the brutal response of the
Chinese Government to the peaceful demonstrations of its citizens. China must abandon
repression as a policy if it expects to be respected as a responsible member of the world
community.
The nations of the world cannot do "business as usual" with tyrants who brutalize their
own people. China's leaders must understand this if they want to continue to enlist the
world's cooperation as they seek to modernize their economy. Development and democracy
have more in common than the sound of the words.
The United States has a proud tradition of leading struggles for human rights and
democracy around the world. President Truman drew the line at Soviet expansion into
Greece and Turkey and forged a coalition of nations that contained Communism for two
generations, until it collapsed in the dramatic events of the last three years.
A similar leadership opportunity awaits President Clinton. He does not face a
superpower with expansionist designs, but rather a series of regional challenges. These can
take many forms -- tyrants who cast a covetous eye on their neighbors' oil or regimes bent on
keeping themselves in power at the expense of the human rights of their own people.
Crafting coalitions and strategies to stabilize these problems will be President
Clinton's major foreign policy challenge. And leading the nations of the world in convincing
China that it cannot continue its destabilizing policies on trade, human rights and arms sales
can provide him with the first opportunity to begin that difficult but critical process.
But the nations of the world cannot afford to isolate China. We must remember that
one in every five people in the world lives in China. Whatever we think of China's current
leadership, its sheer size means that it will play a significant role in the world's political,
economic and environmental affairs.
Breaking ties with China would only hand its future over to the hard-line Marxists
who sent the tanks into Tiananmen. It would not help the cause of democracy, improve trade
relations, or further the cause of arms control. In fact, the darkest periods in China's history
have occurred when it was isolated from the rest of the world.
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MFN IS NOT A SPECIAL PRIVILEGE
To put the upcoming decision on extending MFN trading status into perspective, we
must recognize several facts.
First, MFN is not what it says. It is not the most favored trading status that a nation
can have. It is not a special privilege that we grant to only our closest allies. Despite its
alluring name, MFN is no more than "normal" tariff treatment. Even Iraq, Syria and Iran -hardly our best friends -- enjoy MFN treatment with the United States.
Second, MFN is not even the "most favored" tariff status we offer our trading
partners. In fact, about 100 of our trading partners send their goods to the United States at
tariff rates lower than MFN under such programs as the Generalized System of Preferences,
the Caribbean Basin Initiative and free trade agreements.
Third, no other nation is even considering withdrawing or conditioning MFN for
China. Not Japan. Not Europe. Not Canada. No one. Even Taiwan -- China's archenemy
-- actually moved to expand trade with China in 1992.
Fourth, to withdraw MFN from China would send the wrong signals to China and the
world. It might make us feel good, but it would not do good. It could backfire on us and
invite a repressive backlash in China and hurt American exporters and consumers.
If we were to withdraw MFN, tariffs on Chinese products would skyrocket from their
current rate of about 4 percent to as high as 110 percent. Tariffs on sweaters from China
would go from 6 percent to 60 percent. Tariffs on toys would go from 7 percent to 70
percent. Before MFN was extended to China, our two-way trade was only a tenth of what it
is now. Neither side can afford a return to that situation.
Almost certainly, Beijing would respond to a withdrawal of MFN by cutting off
virtually all U.S. exports to China. U.S. exports to China reached $8 billion in 1991 -growing 16 percent despite a worldwide economic slowdown. One reliable estimate puts
American job losses at 157,000 if China were to switch orders to third-country suppliers for
American products ranging from airplanes to wheat.
ENGAGEMENT HAS WORKED
With MFN in place, the U.S. has been able to address our concerns with China
constructively. We have concluded two major bilateral trade agreements in the past year and
engaged the Chinese on a number of our major concerns.
In January last year, we signed an Intellectual Property Rights Agreement that -- when
brought fully into effect -- will bring China far closer to modem international standards of
protection. This agreement will give U.S. businesses the legal tools to defend their software,
sound recordings and patented drugs against piracy in China.

Then in October, we signed a market access agreement that takes major steps toward
opening China's trading system and has the potential to reduce the huge trade surplus that
China now enjoys. American businesses will face lower tariffs and a more open trading
regime.
Under pressure from the Congress, the Bush Administration negotiated an agreement
to stop China's export of products made with prison labor, and has convinced China to sign
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime.
These steps would not have been possible without MFN in place. MFN has kept
channels of communication open. Withdrawing trade benefits to express our concern about
human rights and arms control would complicate our relationship without the promise of
positive results.
In the post-Cold War world, it is more critical than ever for the United States to
demonstrate its leadership. We must continue to lead the world toward greater respect for
human rights and free, fair trade -- and away from irresponsible sales of arms. There is no
country where we need to test our resolve more than China, and no way better to demonstrate
that resolve than by the patient use of carefully targeted responses. And there is no more
futile policy than isolating China.
TRADING IDEAS WITH GOODS
Trade, by itself, directly promotes reform in China. With MFN in place, we trade
ideas along with goods. Freighters of American wheat bound for Shanghai also carry in their
holds the seeds of democratic ideals. American computer programs have embedded in them
the notions of freedom of inquiry and the value of the market place of competing ideas.
To see the link between the trade in goods and the exchange of ideas, we need only
look at South China. It is no accident that those provinces are the heart of the trade boom
and also the center of political reformist sentiment in China. They see that innovative
economic ideas can only grow in a political climate of free discussion.
Cutting off MFN would hurt the progressives there more than it would the hard-liners
we want to discourage. As capital and labor move more freely, state control of ideas will
become more difficult. And as our trade expands into more areas of China, western ideals
will penetrate further and further into the hinterland. Cutting off MFN would stall that
important process.
This group needs no reminder of the importance of Hong Kong in China's trade.
Cutting off MFN would injure Hong Kong more than it would any Chinese province, at a
time when we need to do all we can to promote and expand democracy in that outpost of
capitalism.
It's easy for Americans -- an ocean away -- to pontificate about what's best for the

Chinese. But the people of Hong Kong live directly with the consequences. It's no accident
that Governor Patten and the people of Hong Kong -- staunch advocates of greater democracy
-- are strongly opposed to efforts to condition MFN.

In short, cutting off China's MFN status could break a critical link between China's
reform movement and the West. Many of Beijing's hard-liners would welcome the chance to
cut off China's forward-thinking South in favor of political orthodoxy.

STATUTORY CONDITIONS
ON MFN ARE SELF-DEFEATING
It would be just as damaging for Congress to impose conditions on the continuation of
China's MFN status as it would be to terminate it completely.
The Chinese hard-liners would likely respond as negatively to conditions as they
would to revocation. New restrictions on MFN thus could well give hard-liners a useful
pretext to advocate diminished ties with the West and a return to greater authoritarianism.
It's an easy argument for the hard-liners to make: "We've tried opening up to the outside
world. Their leader has welcomed our opening by slapping us in the face. The only way for
China to survive is to go back to the old ways."
We should not forget that China's MFN status is already conditional. The law
requires annual review of MFN status for China and only a few other countries -- not the vast
majority of our trading partners. That annual review of MFN is all the conditionality that we
need to impose.
Before the President can recommend each year's extension, he must certify that China
meets Jackson-Vanik requirements. As a practical matter, the process provides an annual
opportunity for the President to review China's MFN status in light of all issues, including
human rights, trade, and other concerns. This can all be done by the Clinton Administration
without a single new sentence of legislation.
But new Congressionally-imposed conditions on extending MFN would hamstring the
President. Congress would have established 17 conditions in the last MFN conditions bill. If
China failed to meet even one of those conditions, President Clinton would effectively be
forced to break ties with China.
Further, even if a conditions bill could be put together that did not force President
Clinton to break off ties with China this year, what of the future? What would keep Congress
from adding new conditions on MFN for China? What would prevent the Congress from
extending the same policy to Arab countries that boycott companies trading with Israel? Or
to Israel if it were to resume building settlements on the West Bank?
It is easy to imagine conditional-MFN bills becoming an annual Congressional
exercise. In time, we might find that no nations could meet a Congressionally-mandated
series of litmus tests on human rights, trade, or a range of other issues.
We in Congress tell our U.S. business executives that they are too oriented to the short
term. We also tell them that they must compete internationally. But how can American
executives plan rationally for the future when there is no guarantee that trade with a given
nation will even be legal in the future?

Trade and competitiveness must be at the core of our foreign policy -- not
afterthoughts.
With President Clinton in the White House, I hope we can reach a consensus policy
on China that balances all interests and avoids a bitter and counterproductive debate over
MFN. All legitimate concerns should be addressed, but U.S. policy should remain balanced.
POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION
Ironically, there is a greater need for coordinated, multilateral cooperation than ever
before. China offers President Clinton a unique opportunity to bring the industrial
democracies into a coordinated response early in his administration. It will require leadership,
building on the progress that his predecessor has made over the last two years under pressure
from Congress.
The Clinton Administration should intensify efforts to bring China's human rights,
trade and armns sae policies into line with those of the rest of the world. It should continue
to prod China with all realistic means at its disposal.
An early statement by President Clinton or Secretary Christopher should emphasize
that the Administration will carefully review China's progress on human rights, arms control
and trade policy when making its June MFN recommendation to the Congress under JacksonVanik.
At the same time, the Administration should make it clear that withdrawal of MFN is
a measure of last resort and that it has more targeted means at its disposal to address our
concerns. That statement should make it clear that further statutory conditions are not
necessary to keep pressure on China. In fact, further statutory constraints would be
counterproductive.
The Administration could couple such a statement with several concrete actions to
demonstrate its resolve:
HUMAN RIGHTS
The Administration should re-emphasize the importance of respect for human rights as
a major element of American foreign policy.
***

First, the Administration should call again for the establishment of a bilateral task
force to discuss human rights and other issues of mutual concern. Informal meetings
to discuss these issues could precede the formal establishment of such a commission
as an interim first step.

*

Second, U.S. broadcasts to the Chinese people should be expanded. During
Tiananmen, millions of Chinese sought the VOA as the source of reliable news on the
events in their own capital. The Chinese Government demonstrated VOA's success by

expelling the VOA correspondent from the country. That is a journalist's badge of
honor for effective reporting.
***

Even now, millions of people in South China turn their rooftop antennas toward Hong
Kong to get reliable news -- even though Hong Kong television is broadcast on a
different standard.

***

Third, the Administration should issue a strong statement in support of democracy in
Hong Kong. That colony's confidence in the U.S. commitment to its future stability is
as important as Beijing's appreciation of our commitment to human rights. Governor
Patten and the people of Hong Kong are on the front line. They deserve our strong
support.

***

Fourth, the State Department and the Customs Service should enforce vigorously the
new agreement to block the import from China of items made with prison labor from
China to the U.S. This would demonstrate both continued U.S. resolve to free and fair
trade with China and the new Administration's seriousness about prison labor exports.
.Athsame time, the Administration should-use the inzpection provisions of this
agreement to press for access to facilities suspected of producing such goods. The
agreement gives the U.S. the right to inspect suspect facilities. The human rights
groups have a long list of such facilities. The new Administration should take
immediate action to exercise its rights. As President Reagan was fond of saying in
another context, "Trust -- but verify."

***"

Finally, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing must stress to senior Chinese officials the new

Administration's commitment to improving respect for human rights in China.
Private reinforcement of public statements is critical.
TRADE
With regard to trade, the Administration should take four additional steps:
***

First, the new President should instruct the U.S. Trade Representative and the
Department of Commerce -- through the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade -to monitor compliance with the intellectual property and market access agreements
rigorously. The agencies should solicit the experiences of U.S. businesses in working
with the Chinese Government to implement the agreements and be prepared to
retaliate swiftly against any Chinese violations of these trade agreements.

***

Second, the U.S. should seek to establish a mechanism to review bilateral trade issues
at senior levels on a frequent, regular and routine basis. Secretary Franklin's trip to
Beijing last month raised the level of the dialogue. The Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade is equipped to address specific trade problems at the working
level, but the U.S.-China trade relationship requires more than one visit by a Secretary
of Commerce to discuss the policy issues.

***

Third, the Administration should ensure that Customs continues vigorous efforts to
intercept mislabeled and improperly trans-shipped Chinese textiles and apparel as they
enter the U.S. Customs should also seek to work further with Chinese authorities to
stop these problems at their source.

***

Finally, the U.S. should continue to examine China's application to join the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -- GAIT -- carefully. The U.S. must continue the
policy of considering China's and Taiwan's petitions separately. Before China is
allowed to enter the GATT, it must demonstrate that its market is truly open to
exports. In the past, when centrally planned economies, such as Poland and Hungary,
sought to enter the GAIT, numerical export targets were negotiated to ensure that
those economies were truly open. Similar targets may be appropriate for China.
ARMS CONTROL

Finally, to address arms control concerns, the Clinton Administration should take two
initiatives:
***

First, the Administration should instruct the intelligence agencies to monitor China's
compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Missile Technology Control
Regime obligations carefully. The Administration should consider imposing targeted
and credible sanctions on high-tech exports to China if it finds definitive evidence of
violations. Most importantly, the U.S. should exercise strong leadership to
multilateralize sanctions.

***

Second, the Administration should also seek to open negotiations with China to secure
Chinese adherence to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

In the past weeks we have heard President-elect Clinton stress many times the need to
avoid "quick fixes" to the long-term problems of the U.S. economy. The same is true with
China. Resolving deep seated problems requires patience and perseverance, not the quick but
emotionally satisfying use of the MFN "big stick." And American leadership can provide the
catalyst for a coordinated approach by the nations of the world to move China toward more
responsible policies.
The activist measures that I have suggested will not guarantee speedy progress. But I

believe that they will encourage movement toward the goals we -- and the world -- seek.

They will go far toward easing Congressional concern about China's behavior. They will also
ease Congressional concerns -- so prevalent in recent years -- that the Executive branch is not
committed to promoting reform in China.
NEED FOR EARLY ACTION
My Congressional colleagues who supported imposing conditions on China's MFN
status have real and legitimate concerns. In fact, the tireless and heroic efforts of George
Mitchell and Nancy Pelosi to bring attention to our concerns with China deserve great credit
for the progress that has been made on addressing our concerns with China's human rights

and arms sale policies, as well as our bilateral trade deficit, China's export of prison labor
products and its trade policies.
Working together, Congress and the new Administration can forge a new policy that
we can all support.
The Administration's success at engaging the Chinese before an MFN decision comes
to the Hill this spring will go a long way toward determining its fate. With the new
Administration and the Congress from the same party, it would damage U.S. credibility
severely to repeat the sniping from opposite ends of Pennsylvania Avenue that we have seen
for the past three years.
But if the Clinton Administration sets an aggressive policy to engage China and take
targeted initiatives for reform, I hope and believe that Congress will have the patience to give
that policy time to work.
The only certainty in China policy now is June 3 -- the anniversary of Tiananmen and
the deadline for the President's annual MFN determination. China's leaders can be
-unpredictable
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Administration has an opportunity, by moving quickly and decisively, to move China toward
becoming a more responsible member of the world community, while at the same time
smoothing a major friction point with the Congress.
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REMARKS OF SENATOR MAX BAUCUS
ON NAFTA IN THE CONGRESS TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
January 29, 1993
There is no foreign policy issue that could affect the U.S. economy more than the
North American Free Trade Agreement.
NAFTA promises to create the largest trading bloc in the world -- with more than 380
million consumers, more than 6 trillion dollars in combined gross national product. Canada is
already our largest trading partner, Mexico our third. With NAFTA in place, those
relationships could only be strengthened. Access for American businesses to the large and
growing Mexican market would be increased. And U.S. businesses stand to gain tremendous
advantages in this market over their Japanese and European competitors, both from better
access to the markets and from economies of scale.
Today, I would like to focus on NAFTA's prospects in the Congress. It is certain to
be one of the most contentious issues we face this session. But the Administration can do
much to ease our concerns before it submits the package for consideration. Let me sketch
some of the issues that must be addressed for NAFTA to win Congressional approval.
In any negotiated agreement, no party gets everything it wants. In NAFTA, there will
be industries that win and industries that lose. With NAFTA in effect, the U.S. stands to gain
far more jobs than it stands to lose. But some industries certainly stand to lose jobs.
Most of those jobs are in labor-intensive industries in which U.S. companies already
face substantial pressure to move production overseas. We cannot allow NAFTA to
accelerate that process.
We must address -- both in NAFTA and in the wider context of global competition -the retraining of U.S. workers whose jobs are threatened by the attraction of lower wages
abroad. In order to minimize any possible disruption stemming from NAFTA, we must
ensure that worker adjustment programs are in place before NAFTA is implemented.
American workers are the most productive in the world. But in some industries,
productivity alone is not enough to keep jobs at home. We need to identify areas and
industries where jobs are at risk and work aggressively to develop programs to retrain
workers who may lose their jobs to foreign competition or other economic pressures.

[more]
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At the end of the Tokyo Round of GATT talks in 1974, Congress and the
Administration recognized that the nation as a whole would benefit from the new Agreement.
But they also recognized that some jobs would be threatened. So Congress passed something
called the "Trade Adjustment Assistance Program" -- the "TAA" -- when it approved the

Tokyo Round. Under TAA, workers who were displaced became eligible for income support
and retraining for productive new jobs.
That bargain held until 1981. But in the last twelve years, Republican administrations
have tried to eliminate TAA every year. We must break this pattern and return to the original
bargain.
The Clinton Administration understands this and has made a worker adjustment
program a precondition to concluding the NAFTA. The Administration has not yet come
forward with a specific legislative proposal. One thing is clear: the program must be in
place before the NAFTA is implemented.
A second key concern regarding the NAFTA as negotiated is its treatment of the
environment. Certainly NAFTA has broken new ground in trade agreements in that it even
takes environmental concerns into account. But the current agreement leaves unaddressed
many of the environmental issues that have been raised. The Clinton Administration has
committed to addressing environmental concerns in a separate side agreement.
At the top of the list of environmental concerns is enforcement of existing laws.
Mexico's environmental protection laws often look very good on paper, but enforcement lags
far behind U.S. levels. Financial resources, technical expertise and -- especially at the local
level -- political inertia all limit Mexico's ability to address its pressing environmental
problems. For Mexican exporters, the absence of effective pollution controls can confer a
significant subsidy.
In the side negotiations, we must find a way to ensure that "pollution does not pay."
Otherwise, NAFTA would inadvertently create an incentive for businesses looking to cut
corners to add to Mexico's already significant environmental problems. We cannot be
responsible for allowing the physical environment in both the U.S. and Mexico -- and the
economy in the U.S. -- all to suffer.

The side agreement will have to address two issues. First, the newly created trinational North American Commission on Environment -- NACE -- must be made an effective

force for promoting environmental protection. Second, the side agreement must create some
kind of binding enforcement mechanism.
The North American Commission on the Environment has been presented as NAFTA's
environmental watchdog, but its membership, duties and enforcement powers remain
undefined. It has been described as everything from an annual meeting of environmental
ministers to an enforcement agency with the power to close down polluters in any of the three
[more]

countries. I reject both of these extremes. The first is too weak, relying on toothless
evaluations of conditions and pledges to clean things up. The second gives too much power
to an appointive body beyond national control.
In the NACE, we need something with teeth, but which recognizes national
sensitivities. Let me suggest a model that I believe would meet both considerations. We
should create a NACE with both consulting and investigating functions.
As consultants, I would envision NACE functioning somewhat along the lines of the
Commerce Department's new Manufacturing Outreach Centers or the Department of
Agriculture's Extension Service. Technical experts, perhaps in regional offices, would be
available to consult with government and business in addressing environmental issues. They
could help a factory manager find the appropriate technology to reduce air and water
pollution. They could meet with enforcement officials to discuss how to meet legal
requirements of proving violations of the laws. And they could guide industries to grant or
loan programs that would aid in financing pollution control.
On the enforcement side, I believe that NACE should be the initial point of
consideration for complaints. But both enforcement and retaliation for lack of enforcement
should remain with national authorities. A permanent multinational staff of experts could
receive complaints of noncompliance with applicable laws from any source.
This staff would evaluate and investigate the complaint. It could recommend
corrective action to the appropriate national environmental agency. If the violation persists,
after a reasonable time NACE experts could recommend to a NAFTA dispute panel that trade
sanctions be imposed. Sanctions could range from banning importation of products of a
single offending firm to selectively snapping back tariffs to pre-NAFTA levels. For this
process to work, inadequate enforcement of environmental laws must also be subject to
NAFTA's dispute settlement process.
This is certainly not the only way to address environmental enforcement, but I believe
it is the best.
No trade agreement before has included restrictions based on the process by which a
product was made. But the global environmental crisis requires that we break new ground.
We and our neighbors can lead the world in this regard. I believe that the environmental
considerations are the single most important issue that the Administration must address before
forwarding NAFTA to Congress. It is not a question of environmental concerns versus
economic concerns. The two are not opposites, they are complements. And an agreement as
important as the NAFTA is certainly the appropriate vehicle to begin linking environmental
and economic development on a multinational scale.
Underlying both the worker adjustment program and the environmental cleanup is the
question of funding. Some have suggested that the U.S. should subsidize increased
[more]

environmental enforcement in Mexico as one price of creating the NAFTA. In these days of
tight government budgets, that is simply a non-starter.
The President has pledged major efforts to cut the deficit in this Administration. A
major worker adjustment program in the U.S. and increased environmental enforcement in
Mexico funded with U.S. tax dollars would make that pledge harder to keep.
On the other hand, a small and temporary surcharge on imports among NAFTA
members would not threaten the overall benefit of the agreement to the North American
economy. Revenue from a "Free Trade Trust Fund" could be dedicated to making possible a
cleaner environment and a brighter economic future for workers who might be displaced.
The surcharge could be very small -- approximately 1 percent of the value of goods
and services -- and it would end after the phase-in period of the Agreement. The size of both
the fee and the worker adjustment program depend to a great extent on whose estimates of
the job impact of NAFTA are accepted. But it would allow us to charge some of the sectorspecific costs against the more general benefits that the NAFTA promises.
President Clinton has come to office on promises to bring an American renewal. The
NAFTA offers unique opportunities to renew the American economy, to strengthen our ties
with our neighbors, and to demonstrate our commitment to global leadership in protecting the
environment. We in the Congress welcome the opportunity to work with the Administration
in seeking to strengthen the NAFTA so it can better meet the needs of the American people.
If we are creative and forward-looking, we can develop a NAFTA that is good for the
North American economy, North American workers and the North American environment.

